Acknowledgements

Natural Resources Canada’s headquarters are located in Ottawa, on traditional and unceded Algonquin Anishinaabe territory. The name “Ottawa” is derived from the Algonquin word “Adawe,” which means “to trade,” highlighting the land’s historical significance as a place of exchange. The development of the proposed Indigenous Ministerial Arrangements Regulations relies on an exchange of knowledge, ensuring that all voices are heard and considered equally. We extend our gratitude to the First Nations, Métis, and Inuit that have participated in this process; this collaboration will serve to strengthen and inform the proposed regulations and reinforces the relationships being built.

Table of Contents

• Acknowledgements
• Glossary
• Introduction
  • Purpose
  • Overview of engagement activities
  • What are Indigenous Ministerial Arrangements Regulations?
• Considerations for the proposed Indigenous Ministerial Arrangements Regulations
  • What is an Indigenous governing body?
  • What could an Indigenous governing body be responsible for under an Arrangement?
  • How do we build capacity?
  • How could an Arrangement work?
  • What are the options for developing regulations?
• Next Steps
• Appendix A: Discussion questions

Glossary

Introduction

Purpose

Enhanced participation and collaboration between Indigenous Peoples and the Government of Canada can advance reconciliation, including through increased participation by Indigenous Peoples based on the principles outlined in the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples Act (UN Declaration Act), and can lead to positive outcomes for federally regulated energy projects subject to the Canadian Energy Regulator Act (CERA).

This discussion paper focuses on a potential new mechanism for increased Indigenous participation under the CERA known as Indigenous Ministerial Arrangements (Arrangements). As per sections 77 and 78 of the CERA, if regulations are developed, Indigenous governing bodies (IGB) could enter into Arrangements with the Minister of Energy and Natural Resources (Minister) to exercise responsibilities (known as powers, duties, and functions) under the CERA.

This discussion paper was developed following input from Indigenous groups who participated in engagement sessions and provided written feedback outlined in the What We Heard Report 2024-25.

The paper explores potential opportunities, benefits, considerations, and options for the proposed regulations. It will be used to support further engagement with Indigenous groups, industry and other stakeholders as well as to inform the development of the proposed Indigenous Ministerial Arrangements Regulations (IMARs/regulations). The considerations presented in this paper are to facilitate discussions and generate ideas to inform the potential development of the proposed regulations; they do not reflect the views of Natural Resources Canada (NRCan) or the Government of Canada.

Some of the considerations could be better suited to be included in a supporting policy framework. In comparison to the proposed regulations, a supporting policy framework would include further guidance for implementation, while providing for greater flexibility in the process.

Overview of engagement activities

Between April 2024 and March 2025, NRCan engaged with Indigenous groups to learn about their interests and seek input on the potential development of the proposed regulations, and 25 written submissions were shared. In total, over 100 Indigenous groups were engaged, including individual communities, associations and Nations, governments, Tribal Councils, and for-profit and nonprofit organizations. A summary of the engagement activities and key themes is included in a What We Heard Report 2024-25 published in December 2025.

What are Indigenous Ministerial Arrangements Regulations?

The proposed regulations, if developed, would allow for Arrangements to be reached between an IGB and the Minister. These Arrangements would authorize an IGB to undertake greater participation in regulatory processes for energy infrastructure regulated by the Canada Energy Regulator (CER) by exercising specified powers, duties and functions (PDFs) under the CERA.[i] Reaching these Arrangements would remain discretionary to the Minister and the IGB; the proposed regulations will not force the Minister or the IGB to enter into an Arrangement.

The proposed regulations could be developed under the CERA. The CERA replaced the National Energy Board Act in 2019 by establishing the CER and providing a framework for the CER’s operations, including its powers, duties and procedures. The CER is a lifecycle regulator; this means that they oversee a project throughout its lifecycle; from the initial assessment of an energy project proposal submitted by a proponent (i.e., company) through construction and operation to the abandonment or decommissioning of the infrastructure. Figure 1. provides an overview of a project’s lifecycle under the CERA.

Figure 1. Project Lifecycle

United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples Act

In addition to Arrangements with IGBs being referenced in sections 77 and 78 of the CERA, the proposed IMARs is also linked to sections 5 and 6 of Canada’s UN Declaration Act which provides a framework for the implementation of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UN Declaration). In June 2023, the Government of Canada published an Action Plan to advance implementation of the UN Declaration. The Action Plan includes 181 Action Plan Measures. Action Plan Measure Shared Priority 34 (APM SP34) is directly linked to the potential development of the proposed IMARs:

“Work in consultation and cooperation with First Nation, Métis and Inuit communities, governments and organizations to (i) enhance the participation of Indigenous Peoples in and (ii) set the measures that could enable them to exercise federal regulatory authority in respect of, projects and matters that are currently regulated by the Canada Energy Regulator (CER).”

Working alongside other elements of APM SP34 (as shown in Figure 2.), the proposed IMARs could contribute towards increased Indigenous involvement in oversight and/or decision-making in the federal regulation of energy infrastructure. Throughout the discussion paper, NRCan has presented considerations on what could be included in the proposed IMARs or a supporting policy framework and how Arrangements could be implemented, recognizing both the broad scope of the CER’s authority and the substantial resources and expertise required to support effective Arrangements. Work on the development and eventual implementation of the proposed IMARs could help identify gaps and areas where further work is necessary to support Indigenous leadership in the longer term.

Figure 2. Elements of APM SP34

Text description: The image is a flow diagram titled Elements of Action Plan Measure Shared Priority 34, which illustrates a four-tiered progression of Indigenous involvement in oversight and decision-making for energy projects. An upward arrow indicates that authority increases from the bottom level to the top.

Top Level: Indigenous Decision-Making Institution – Consult and cooperate to identify and take the measures needed to support Indigenous governing bodies, and/or the potential establishment of new Indigenous decision-making institutions, to exercise regulatory authority on projects and matters regulated by the Canada Energy Regulator.

Second level: IMARs – Develop regulations that would enable Indigenous governing bodies to be authorized to exercise specific powers, duties and functions under the Canadian Energy Regulator Act.

Third level: Systemic Model – Develop a systematic model to enhance Indigenous Peoples involvement in compliance and oversight over the lifecycle.

Bottom level: Onshore Pipeline Regulations and Filing Manuals – Amend the Canadian Energy Regulator Onshore Pipeline Regulations and Filing Manuals applicable to the lifecycle of CER-regulated infrastructure.

Considerations for the proposed Indigenous Ministerial Arrangements Regulations

During NRCan’s engagement with Indigenous groups in 2024-25, a common concept raised was that the proposed regulations should be open and flexible, so that Arrangements could be negotiated using a distinctions-based approach and address considerations that could vary among Indigenous groups, such as the interests of Indigenous groups, the geography, the industry proponent, and the type, size, and details of the project(s). Indigenous groups noted that these considerations impact the practicality, capacity, and desire for an IGB to enter into an Arrangement with the Minister.

In light of this feedback, the discussion paper considers options to enable regulatory flexibility regarding the establishment of Arrangements.

What is an Indigenous governing body?

An “Indigenous governing body” (IGB) is defined within the CERA as a council, government or other entity that is authorized to act on behalf of an Indigenous group, community or people that holds rights recognized and affirmed by section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982.

Depending on the flexibility of the proposed regulations, the broad nature of this definition could enable Indigenous groups to authorize an IGB of their choosing through an authorization process determined by the Indigenous group(s) involved. An Indigenous group could choose to authorize an IGB independently, or in partnership with other Indigenous groups. Further, an IGB could be authorized representatives of First Nations, Métis or Inuit, including existing organizations such as a band council and may include national, provincial or regional organizations. Indigenous groups could choose reliance on a Band Council Resolution, provide a letter of support or leverage other processes when authorizing an IGB.

Verifying an IGB’s authority to represent section 35 rights holders

The CERA defines an IGB broadly. A verification process could be useful for the purposes of identifying whether an IGB has authority to act on behalf of Indigenous groups for the purposes of reaching an Arrangement. Careful analysis and input from rights-holding collectives would be required before establishing a verification process. Indigenous governance models are diverse, and an Indigenous group could also have different coexisting governance systems (e.g., a First Nation has both an elected Chief and Band Council and a Hereditary Chief) which would also need to be considered in designing the verification process for an IGB.

Requirements for verifying an IGB’s authority to represent section 35 rights holders could be included in the proposed regulations or guidance could be added in a supporting policy framework. This verification process could:

• Rely on recognized governance systems;
• Require documentation to be submitted by an Indigenous group(s).

Is an Arrangement national, regional or project-based?

The CERA does not define where an Arrangement could apply. As a result, an Arrangement could be applied nationally, regionally or to a specific project, which could inform how an IGB establishes its structure and organization. This could mean that an IGB could represent one or more Indigenous groups, formed around a specific project or geographic area.

The proposed regulations could include requirements on the circumstances under which Arrangements may be entered into, including whether Arrangements would be entered into using a single, consistent approach to where they would apply. Leaving this to be decided during the negotiation of Arrangements could result in inconsistent implementation or duplication in the regulatory framework. Some approaches that could be considered include national, regional or project-based Arrangements, as described in Table 1.

Table 1. Options for the Scope of the Arrangements

In addition to the specific considerations presented in Table 1, there are additional factors that could be considered when contemplating an approach:

• Effectiveness of representation: facilitating effective representation of local, project-specific interests, especially by groups potentially affected by the project, and ensuring enough flexibility to support a distinctions-based approach that accommodates the unique governance needs and mandates of different Indigenous groups.
• Maintaining Indigenous inclusion in CER processes: ensuring that the ability for an IGB to enter into an Arrangement does not create barriers to participation for Indigenous groups in the regulatory process.
• Overlapping rights: mitigating the risks of potential disputes when multiple Indigenous groups claim rights over the same area or in cases where there could be multiple IGBs in the same area or representing similar Indigenous groups.
• Implementation efficiency: balancing the need for regulatory certainty and efficiency.
• Mitigation of conflict of interest situations: defining the necessary governance and ethical frameworks to ensure impartial decision-making.
• Linkages across existing CER initiatives and APM SP34 elements: determining how the proposed regulations can build on the work established under the Indigenous Advisory Monitoring Committees for TMX and Line 3 and additional processes being contemplated through the APM SP34 initiatives, such as a Systemic Model (Element 3).
  
  

To ensure clarity on whether an Arrangement can be reached, certain conditions could be required by the proposed regulations or listed as guidance in a supporting policy framework. These conditions could include the considerations mentioned above, such as overlapping rights and the number of Indigenous groups represented by an IGB. Conditions could further inform the content of an Arrangement, through limiting the authority of an IGB to specific functions or to a specific region, for instance.

What could an Indigenous governing body be responsible for under an Arrangement?

What are the powers, duties and functions under CERA?

The CERA enables the CER to exercise powers, duties and functions (PDFs). The CER has a mission to regulate energy infrastructure (like interprovincial and international pipelines and power lines) safely and reliably, while respecting First Nations, Métis, and Inuit rights and supporting Canada's move toward net-zero emissions.

PDFs that may be included within an Arrangement under the proposed regulations are limited to those that fall within the mandate of the CER.[iv] Under the CERA, the CER:

• Acts as a quasi-judicial body: The CER Commission functions as a quasi-judicial tribunal, making independent and impartial decisions on a wide range of energy matters. This adjudicator role involves holding public hearings to review applications. The Commission considers all evidence, including public and Indigenous input, to determine whether a project can be authorized. It also has a role in relation to pipeline tolls, tariffs, and land access.
• Regulates energy infrastructure under federal jurisdiction: The CER oversees the entire lifecycle of federally regulated pipelines and power lines. It sets and enforces strict safety and environmental standards through inspections, audits, and incident reviews and has the authority to issue enforcement actions (e.g., stop work orders, monetary penalties) for non-compliance.
• Acts as a comprehensive authority under the CERA: The CER is responsible for regulating the export of energy products, publishing objective energy information and analysis, and fostering inclusive public and Indigenous engagement to ensure its processes are fair and transparent.
  
  

Table 2 provides an overview of the CER’s governance, the different authorities and examples of their PDFs under the CERA.

Table 2. Overview of CER Governance

What could be included in an Arrangement?

The proposed regulations could specify which PDFs under the CERA could be subject to an Arrangement or could explicitly outline any provision(s) of CERA or its regulations that could be excluded from an Arrangement.[v]

There are hundreds of PDFs under the CERA and its regulations, and only a limited number of examples have been provided in this paper as an overview of options to consider, while also noting some potential non-transferable authorities. For instance, Ministerial and Governor in Council authorities fall under the authority of the Minister of Energy and Natural Resources and federal Cabinet and would not be considered in the proposed regulations.

Identifying which PDFs could be subject to an Arrangement could simplify the negotiation process for the Arrangements, focusing on areas that are of most interest and impactful to IGBs. It may also be beneficial to decide which of the CERA’s PDFs an IGB could build the capacity to undertake in the short versus long term, and how the Arrangements could compliment or leverage existing CER initiatives, such as the Indigenous monitoring program[vi], collaborative agreements under section 76 of the CERA and intervening in a project review. The Arrangements should not be designed in a way that would limit an Indigenous group’s ability to participate in existing processes or any potential future regulatory initiatives implemented by the Government of Canada, such as elements being explored under APM SP34.

Implementing a phased or incremental approach to the proposed regulations could enable a gradual increase in responsibilities of an IGB, as capacity increases over time. The discussion paper explores what a phased approach could look like in the section “Exploring a phased approach to implementation.”

How could PDFs be taken on by an IGB?

The CER primarily regulates linear projects such as international and interprovincial pipelines and international and designated interprovincial power lines, which are often long and cover vast areas, from the initial application through to the abandonment or decommissioning of the infrastructure.

Table 3 below highlights considerations for examples of PDFs that could be of interest for an IGB to take on. The table is organized from simple to more complex examples of PDFs. As each Arrangement would be unique, the responsibilities of an IGB would vary depending on the specific situation. The table is for illustrative purposes only as the regulations have not yet been developed.

Table 3. Considerations For Taking On Powers, Duties And Functions Under The CERA

 What could be the legal implications?

Depending on the PDFs an IGB exercises, executing the terms of an Arrangement could have various legal implications. Decisions made by the CER’s staff and its Commission throughout the infrastructure’s lifecycle can be subject to adjudication processes through the CER Commission and through court challenges in Canada’s court system, including decisions made on project approvals, enforcement actions, and land and compensation disputes. These challenges could come from proponents, Indigenous groups, landowners, municipalities, or other impacted groups. As a result, decisions made by an IGB could also be subject to legal challenges. An IGB’s exercise of PDFs under the CERA may result in additional administrative, financial and legal obligations and responsibilities for the IGB.

The scope of these obligations and responsibilities would be reduced if an IGB exercised a limited scope of PDFs. In addition, there may be opportunities to leverage existing CER adjudication or administrative processes or share the execution of the PDFs with the CER.

How could conflicts of interest be managed?

It is essential that the exercise of PDFs under the CERA respect key principles of fairness and equity. To safeguard the regulatory system, measures for avoiding conflicts of interest should be in place. Conflicts of interest (perceived, potential, or actual) could include situations where an IGB is responsible for exercising PDFs under the CERA without any safeguard measures while also:

• Holding equity ownership in CER-regulated infrastructure;
• Being responsible for negotiating an Impact Benefit Agreement (IBA); and/or,
• Being the recipient of funding related to the project (IBA, loan guarantees, contributions, etc.).
  
  

Conflicts of interest are fact specific and should be evaluated case-by-case given their unique characteristics. A process to identify a potential conflict of interest and an approach to address them should be considered for the proposed regulations.

The identification of perceived, potential or actual conflict of interest could be outlined in the proposed regulations or supporting policy framework, requiring IGBs to:

• Declare perceived, potential, or actual conflicts of interest; and,
• Provide updated information throughout the course of an Arrangement if a new conflict of interest arises.
  
  

Regulatory or policy options to address conflicts of interest could include:

• Mitigating situations of conflict of interest to ensure an IGB with a conflict of interest does not undertake regulatory responsibilities;
• Developing regulations with an option for the CER to continue carrying out PDFs in cases of conflict of interest of an IGB; and/or,
• Developing policies and governance approaches to address conflict of interest situations proactively (e.g., recusal of IGB member(s) with a conflict of interest).
  
  

How do we build capacity?

Prior to negotiating an Arrangement, an IGB would assess their readiness to enter into an Arrangement, including their current and future capacity needs. There are two main areas where capacity building may be required:

1. Governance capacity to support an Indigenous group(s) in establishing and/or authorizing an IGB and developing the necessary frameworks to enable the IGB to negotiate and implement an Arrangement; and,
2. Technical capacity for an established IGB to exercise the PDFs outlined in the negotiated Arrangement.

Capacity to establish an Indigenous governing body

An Indigenous group(s) may require additional support to develop the internal governance structure(s) to establish and/or authorize an IGB and prepare to enter into negotiations with the Minister for the purposes of an Arrangement. This could be in the form of financial capacity, knowledge and expertise and/or access to technical resources.

Capacity to exercise powers, duties and functions

Depending on the PDFs the IGB wishes to undertake, there could be different levels of resourcing and expertise required. For example, inspection officers designated under subsection 102(1) of the CERA typically have degrees in environmental science or engineering, and/or they have several years of experience working in the regulatory space. High levels of experience are required before the CER fully authorizes them to exercise PDFs, along with ongoing training. This can be a multi-year process, as the individual continues to gain relevant experience.

An IGB could require additional support to address gaps in their technical capacity. Capacity could be built through access to:

• Long-term financial support;
• Federal resources, such as technicians and subject-matter experts;
• Specialized equipment and systems;
• Specialized education or training and shadowing CER staff;
• Legal support; and,
• Information held by the CER and proponents.
  
  

Through an Arrangement, an IGB and representatives from Canada could negotiate the necessary supports required for an IGB to undertake the PDFs. Building off the inspection officer example in the paragraph above, an IGB could also shadow the CER or access training for a period of time before they begin taking on inspection officer responsibilities. This process could take several years given the nature of the responsibilities and authority held by an inspection officer. This could mean a gradual increase in responsibility over the course of an Arrangement, with the first goal being capacity building, followed by the execution of specified PDFs. Further considerations can be found in the section “Exploring a phased approach to implementation.”

How could an Arrangement work?

Once an IGB is established, the lifecycle of an Arrangement could be viewed in a circle of phases including assessment, negotiation, implementation, and evaluation. Each of these phases can be seen in Figure 3. and are described in further detail below.

Figure 3. A Circular Model For Indigenous Ministerial Arrangements

Text description: A diagram illustrating a circular model for developing Indigenous Ministerial Arrangements through a foundational step and a continuous circular process. Step. 0: An IGB is established. Once established, the process enters a four-stage loop: 1. Assessment; 2. Negotiation; 3. Implementation; and 4. Evaluation.

0. Establishing an IGB

As set out in the CERA, an Arrangement entered into under the proposed regulations is between the Minister and an IGB. This means that an IGB must be established and authorized to act on behalf of an Indigenous group, community or people that holds rights recognized and affirmed by section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982. As explored in the section “What is an Indigenous governing body,” this authorization process would be determined by the Indigenous group(s) who would be interested in entering into an Arrangement and could be followed by a verification process ensuring that the IGB is authorized by the Indigenous group(s).

1. Assessment

IGB conducts an assessment

Prior to negotiating an Arrangement, an IGB would determine their interests and capacity to enter into an Arrangement and eventually exercise PDFs. At minimum, an IGB would need to ensure they have received authorization from section 35 rights holders to represent them as an IGB for the purposes of an Arrangement.

During this stage, the IGB could also:

• Identify and declare any perceived, potential or actual conflicts of interest;
• Identify measures to address perceived, potential or actual conflict of interests;
• Identify PDFs of interest to the IGB to exercise; and,
• Assess current and required capacity to exercise PDFs.
  
  

Representatives from Canada would not be involved in the IGB’s assessment but would be involved in the review process to determine whether negotiations on an Arrangement can be pursued and available to provide additional information about the proposed IMARs, if needed.

Reviewing an assessment

Upon completion of the assessment, an IGB would then present it to the Minister to review. The review could:

• Verify an IGB’s authority;
• Review declared conflicts of interest and measures to address perceived, potential or actual conflict of interests; and,
• Review the PDFs identified by the IGB as per the regulations and assess the capacity requirements.
  
  

The possibility of seeking advice or input from other Indigenous organizations to support an assessment or to review an assessment could be considered further. For instance, there could be the option of hiring an Indigenous-led third party to review the assessment and provide advice to the Indigenous group and the Minister. This third party could potentially have a role throughout the negotiation process and in assessing readiness to take on certain PDFs under the CERA.

Confirming the intent to negotiate

With the assessment reviewed, the Minister and the IGB would discuss whether they intend to negotiate an Arrangement. It is possible that the interest of an Indigenous group aligns more with a different form of participation in a CER process than through an Arrangement.

If there is agreement to move forward with an Arrangement, representatives from Canada and the IGB would define their respective roles and responsibilities, setting a clear framework for the negotiations that follow. Consultation and collaboration with the CER would be necessary in the development of an Arrangement.

2. Negotiation

Once an assessment is completed, negotiations between the Minister and an IGB would begin to develop an Arrangement. The process could include steps such as negotiating terms, issuing public notice and consultation with potentially impacted parties.

Issuing public notice and consultation

The legislation does not specify requirements for public notice and consultation for negotiating the Arrangements. Requirements for public notice and/or consultation could possibly be set in the proposed regulations, or guidance could be provided in a supporting policy framework. This could include representatives from Canada and the IGB issuing a public notice and initiating a public consultation process. This step would ensure transparency by engaging all potentially impacted Indigenous groups, as well as stakeholders such as industry, landowners and provinces and territories. This broad consultation could allow for a wide range of perspectives to be heard and considered, building a more robust and inclusive foundation for the Arrangement.

Negotiating the contents of the Arrangement

This could be the core of the negotiation process, where representatives from Canada and the IGB negotiate the terms of the Arrangement based on the requirements of the regulations. It could include details like timelines, termination, conflict resolution, and reporting. The parties would also determine the specific PDFs the IGB would execute, tailoring them to the Arrangement's scope and the IGB's capacity. Terms related to capacity building could also be contemplated at this stage.

What could go into an Arrangement?

At minimum, an Arrangement would:

• Include elements that would be required under the proposed regulations;
• Be signed by the IGB and the Minister;
• Specify the PDFs an IGB would be assuming; and,
• Specify the timing for taking on the PDFs an IGB would be assuming.
  
  

Other terms to consider in the Arrangement could include:

• Guiding principles rooted in Indigenous values, knowledge, and laws;
• Further specifying the PDFs to be exercised, including the possibility of describing under which circumstances they may or may not be exercised;
• Protocols for implementation that address timeframes, conflict resolution, coordination with other jurisdictions, etc.;
• Reporting and evaluation requirements to guide the implementation of the Arrangement;
• Requirements for capacity supports;
• Inclusion of backstop provisions to ensure that the appropriate safeguards are in place in case a party of the Arrangement is unable to execute the terms of the Arrangement. These provisions would ensure there are no gaps in authority by having another authority (i.e., the CER) exercise PDFs under CERA.
  
  

Consultation and public comment period

A mechanism for public consultation providing for a comment period could be considered as part of the proposed regulations or pursued in a supporting policy framework. For instance, a draft Arrangement could be posted online for Indigenous and public consultation and comment, where representatives from Canada and the IGB could engage with Indigenous groups and other stakeholders to identify issues or concerns. Consultations with Indigenous groups whose section 35 Aboriginal or treaty rights may be impacted by an Arrangement would be undertaken by NRCan as the representative of the Crown. Mechanisms to protect confidential information could also be set out in the proposed regulations or as part of the process.

Finalization

Representatives from Canada and the IGB would negotiate changes resulting from negotiations. If a consultation period is pursued, comments received during the consultation period will be considered. Once the Arrangement is finalized, the Minister and the IGB representative would sign the Arrangement.

Publication

The final Arrangement will be accessible on the CER’s website within 30 days of the signing by both parties. This is a requirement listed under subsection 77(2) of the CERA.

3. Implementation

During the implementation stage, the IGB would be exercising federal regulatory authority based on the terms outlined in the Arrangement. Successfully implementing an Arrangement will rely on the maintenance of strong relationships between the IGB, NRCan, the CER, provincial and territorial regulatory bodies (as necessary), industry and other impacted groups, such as landowners and Indigenous groups.

4. Evaluation/Review

Periodic evaluation or review of an Arrangement is beneficial to ensure that it remains effective, relevant, and responsive to changes in the environment as well as the growing capacity and interest of the IGB. A review is even more relevant in the context of phased implementation of an Arrangement, as discussed further in the section “Exploring a phased approach to implementation”, allowing time for all parties to build capacity, learn from experience, identify unintended consequences, and make data-informed adjustments that improve the Arrangement over time, giving more responsibility and agency to an IGB as readiness shifts. Timelines for the review of an Arrangement can vary and could be negotiated in the development of the Arrangement; a review period of 5 years could be considered to allow time for implementation prior to evaluation.

What are the options for developing regulations?

Content of regulations may vary depending on the objectives they are trying to achieve. Section 78 of the CERA outlines the criteria for the proposed regulations:

78 The Governor in Council may make regulations respecting the Minister’s power to enter into arrangements under section 77, including regulations:

1. respecting how they are to be entered into;
2. respecting the circumstances under which they may be entered into;
3. respecting their contents; and
4. varying or excluding any provision of this Act or a regulation made under it as that provision applies to the subject matter of the arrangement.
   
   

This paper presents three different approaches to develop regulations, as described in Table 4.

Table 4. Options For Regulatory Approaches For The Development Of The Proposed IMARs

To implement any of the three approaches, a supporting policy framework would be created to inform how the proposed regulations are implemented and to provide guidance on how to negotiate Arrangements.

Exploring a phased approach to implementation

Considering the complexity of executing many of the PDFs under the CERA, it may be more reasonable to apply a phased approach to implementing the proposed regulations. A phased approach to implementation of a regulation means rolling out the regulations in stages over time to help ensure stronger implementation by building capacity over time.

Through a phased approach, an IGB could take on a limited number of PDFs at the onset and increase their level of regulatory authority as they continue to increase capacity and expertise. There could be time built into the process to ensure there are opportunities to shadow and learn from the CER in order to build capacity within the IGB.

A phased approach could address some of the initial implementation challenges related to capacity and liability, as the Arrangement could account for a gradual increase in authority as capacity increases. Coming into force of the regulations could also be delayed to enable time for capacity building should that approach be of interest to Indigenous groups, stakeholders, or other interested parties.

Example of a phased approach scenario: PDFs of an inspection officer

Inspection officers have certain PDFs granted to them under sections 102-109 of the CERA, including for example:

• Access and investigative authority: The right to enter any regulated site or property to conduct compliance verification, which includes the power to take samples, take photographs, conduct a full audit, and access all relevant electronic and physical records.
• Operational control and information gathering: The power to direct site activities by ordering a person to stop or start equipment, prohibit access to a work area, or compel site personnel to provide information and establish their identity.
• Enforcement action: The power to issue orders to a company to immediately suspend work or take any necessary measures to prevent or mitigate a hazard to safety, security, property, or the environment.
  
  

These examples from the CERA present several considerations related to the transfer of PDFs to an IGB. Inspection officer authorities can bear significant resourcing and training requirements and can be subject to legal challenges.

By applying a phased approach, the proposed regulations could initially focus on a set of PDFs, such as those related to inspection officers, for example. Initial Arrangements could focus on building the necessary long-term governance and technical capacity of IGBs to be able to increase the level of responsibility over time.

The ongoing review of regulations as part of the government of Canada’s regulatory stock review process could enable a phased approach, and the proposed regulations could require a review on a recurrent cycle. The regulatory review process is designed to ensure continuous improvement of federal government regulations. In this context, as IGB capacity and experience develops, further work could be undertaken on the proposed regulations.

Next Steps

Your thoughts on the development of the proposed Indigenous Ministerial Arrangements Regulations are important to NRCan. If you have suggestions, ideas, or comments please:

• Send us an email:imar-rama@nrcan-rncan.gc.ca
• Submit comments on Let’s Talk Natural Resources: www.letstalknaturalresources.ca
• Request a meeting with NRCan by sending us an email:imar-rama@nrcan-rncan.gc.ca
• Attend one of our engagement sessions:natural-resources.canada.ca/indigenous-regulations
  
  

The deadline for submitting comments on the discussion paper is March 31, 2026. If you are interested in learning more about the proposed Indigenous Ministerial Arrangements Regulations before submitting comments, you may request further information from NRCan at imar-rama@nrcan-rncan.gc.ca.

Please visit the IMARs webpage for more information and updates on the proposed regulations, including information on engagement activities.

Following engagement on the discussion paper, NRCan will be undertaking analysis to develop the proposed regulations. Regulatory development is ongoing and there will be opportunities for input throughout the next phases of the IMARs National Engagement Strategy.

Appendix A: Discussion questions

What is an Indigenous governing body?

1. What are the advantages and/or disadvantages of each of the options presented above (national, regional or project-based)?
   • How could the options address considerations presented in this section?
   • How could national, regional or project-based arrangements best manage the issue of overlapping rights?
     
     

What could an Indigenous governing body be responsible for under an Arrangement?

1. In the context of the proposed regulations, what types of regulatory authority would be of interest for an IGB to undertake?
2. What types of regulatory authority do you think would be better suited to remain under the CER’s authority and/or could be more successfully implemented under a model of shared execution between the CER and the IGB, why?
3. There are some PDFs in the CERA that carry higher legal risks and resourcing requirements to exercise. Could a model that proposes shared regulatory oversight between an IGB and the CER help alleviate these aspects of implementing an Arrangement, why or why not?
4. What guidance or mechanisms could be used to address perceived, potential or actual conflicts of interest for IGBs?
   • Is there anything else that should be consider for addressing a perceived, potential or actual conflict of interest for an IGB?
     
     

How do we build capacity?

1. In what way should capacity be provided to ensure that an IGB can adequately enter into an Arrangement and carry out the terms of that Arrangement?
   
   

How could an Arrangement work?

1. How could an IGB’s authority to represent rights holders be verified?
   • Who should be involved in the verification process of an IGB (e.g., representatives from Canada, impacted Indigenous groups, impartial third parties) and what role should they play?
   • What type of documentation could be used in the verification process?
2. Are there specific terms, such as the terms proposed in the section “Negotiating the contents of the Arrangement,” that should be required for all Arrangements?
   • Specific PDFs under the CERA have set timelines that the CER is bound by. How can the negotiation process balance these requirements while being respectful of Indigenous values, knowledge, and laws?
3. How could an IGB be supported during implementation in the first few years of an Arrangement or as responsibilities increase?
4. Some PDFs under the CERA could be exercised on private land; how could an IGB, the CER, proponents, landowners, and other impacted groups work together to maintain respectful access to private land?
5. How would a 5-year evaluation/review cycle support the long-term implementation of an Arrangement?
6. What mechanisms could be put in place to enable IGBs, stakeholders, Indigenous groups and interested parties to provide feedback on an Arrangement?
   
   

What are the options for developing regulations?

1. Would a phased approach to Arrangements be of interest to Indigenous groups and stakeholders?
2. What types of PDFs are of interest for initial phases of the proposed regulations, if a phased approach was taken?

Footnotes

[i] Federal energy infrastructure regulated under the CERA includes interprovincial and international pipelines, international and designated interprovincial power lines, and offshore renewable projects not covered by the Accords. The Accords refers to the Memorandum of Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government of the Province of Newfoundland and Labrador on offshore petroleum resource management and revenue sharing dated February 11, 1985, and includes any amendments thereto, and the Canada-Nova Scotia Offshore Petroleum Resources Accord dated August 26, 1986, and any amendments thereto.